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Influence of Seapower upon History epub ebook

by Alfred T. Mahan

Influence of Seapower upon History epub ebook

Author: Alfred T. Mahan
Category: Humanities
Language: English
Publisher: Farrar Straus & Giroux (June 1, 1957)
Pages: 495 pages
ISBN: 0809000105
ISBN13: 978-0809000104
Rating: 4.8
Votes: 284
Other formats: lit lrf txt mobi


The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783 is a history of naval warfare published in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783 is a history of naval warfare published in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan. It details the role of sea power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and discussed the various factors needed to support and achieve sea power, with emphasis on having the largest and most powerful fleet. Scholars considered it the single most influential book in naval strategy.

This is one of those unknown enormously influential books in history. Mahan's thesis that for an nation to be great it had to be a sea power was immensely influential in the growth of the German Navy prior to World War 1 and the expansion of the US into overseas areas in the late 1800's and early 1900's. An Absolute MUST READ for history and political science students.

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (At the time of original publication Mahan was a Captain) the Influence of Sea Power upon History was and perhaps remains, the single most influential book ever written by an American. It was written for the purpose of changing American attitudes towards modernizing its Navy. Via President Theodore Roosevelt it did just that.

The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected.

History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore largely military. Sea Power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength. 225. Peculiar position of France as regards Sea Power. 226. Depressed condition of France

History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore largely military. 1. Permanence of the teachings of history. 2. Unsettled condition of modern naval opinion. Contrasts between historical classes of war-ships. Depressed condition of France. 227. Commercial prosperity of England.

It continues to be a primary reference for naval students and historians. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 presents the argument that, despite great changes and scientific advances in naval weaponry, certain principles of naval strategy remain constant. Beginning in the time of Alexander the Great, those nations with strong commercial and military command of the seas were the nations of greatest strength, wealth, and power.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an American naval officer, considered one of the most important naval .

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an American naval officer, considered one of the most important naval strategists of the nineteenth century. In 1885 he was appointed Lecturer in Naval History and Tactics at the US Naval War College, and became President of the institution between 1886-1889. This highly influential volume, first published in 1890, contains Mahan's analysis of naval warfare and tactics between 1660-1783

Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer), 1840-1914. Book digitized by Google from the library of the University of Virginia and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

Mahan, A. (Alfred Thayer), 1840-1914 You can read The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Pt. 27 by Mahan, A. (Alfred Thayer), 1840-1914 in our library for absolutely free. Read various fiction books with us in our e-reader. Influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783. One hundred years ago this week, Mahan received the advance copies of the book and it began its literary life as one of the most influential American books of the 19th century. V2. 54 1991 91-33383 909'. 6- dc20 CIP CONTENTS Acknowledgements PARTI: THEN AND NOW 1 1. Opening Remarks 3 Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, . Navy President, Naval War College 2. The Influence of History On Mahan 7 Professor Barry M. Gough Department of History, Wilfred Laurier University 3. Mahan, Tactics and Principles of Strategy 25 Captain Wayne.

Influential classic of naval history and tactics still used as text in war colleges. Read by Kaiser Wilhelm, both Roosevelts, other leaders. First paperback edition. 4 maps. 24 battle plans.
Reviews (7)
POFOD
Confession is supposed to be good for the soul. My confession is that I was aware of Mahan's seminal work on sea power for decades and included discussion of it in my history classes (FYI, I taught high school history for 13 years after 30 years in the Army.), but I had never read it.
The author clearly states the time period, 1660-1783, under study at the beginning. I would have preferred him to have started with the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English in 1588, especially since he gave so much attention to the Punic Wars.
Although written in in 1889, Mahan foreshadowed the territorial gains made during the Spanish-American War almost a decade later when he stated the need for stations in the Caribbean. However, stating that "Such colonies the U.S. has not and is not likely to have," he did not anticipate that we would retain the Philippines as a colony.
While recognizing this book focuses on sea power, I feel that Mahan should have given some details on what was happening on the ground. For example, he give no details on the capture of Quebec.
I was disappointed that there was no concluding chapter. The ending with the treaties signed at Versailles in 1783 seemed abrupt.
Mahan's work had a major influence on the shaping of nations' military force structure for decades. Teddy Roosevelt and Winston Churchill are two among many who embraced the concepts contained in the book.

YSOP
I read this book primarily because of its great influence on decision makers and strategists when it was first published in 1890. A.T. Mahan has been described as one of the most influential authors of his time. Mahan was a career naval officer (Captain), Naval Academy graduate, and lecturer at the U.S. Naval War College.
The book is not and never was written for the general interest reader (like me). The reader must have an in-depth knowledge of European Wars (particularly naval actions) of the book's time frame. Additionally, the reader needs to intimately understand square-rigger sailing and fighting. The book is dense, repetitive, and its prose is not very good. Except for descriptions of naval engagements, which I found informative, I skimmed a good deal of the book. I'm also not sure all of Mahan's broad conclusions make sense. To be fair, though I have the benefit of hindsight.
I would only recommend this book to those highly interested in Mahan or his subject. One note: the kindle version is free on Amazon.

felt boot
Perhaps the most influential book on naval affairs to date, this copy is far better than most available. Still has the maps omitted in some versions, such as the B&N one I used to have. It shows how control of the ocean gives a significant advantage to the side which has it, and hammers home the proof of it. If other navies hadn't tended to concede the ocean to Britannia, we would have a much different world today, and this tells you exactly why.

Eng.Men
I knew the contents of this book from so many (navy) teachings. I thought. But, read the actual text and it is so much more organic rather than mere rules to follow or avoid from an expert.

Kind of fun to follow the logic of setting up a fleet of ships under wind (sail) for attack vs defense. Is there defense? Ever? What is a safe fortress at sea? Great strategically. What if the wind goes dead? Fast vs powerful? But great pictures on every page.

Think you are smart? Test how smart you are when the results rely on the cooperation of weather. No wonder history is so screwed up.

Bludworm
Outstanding (!) Insights to the influence of geography and technology on policy --- should be required reading for all would be "COOs". Although written more than a hundred years ago Mahan easily translates into post modern considerations. When combined with John Boyd's analytical constructs Mahan's writings provide a basis for real post modern strategic thinking.

Akinonris
This edition includes major parts of two books by renowned naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, along with an introduction by Antony Preston. The two sources are:

"Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783" (abridged) and
"Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution 1793-1812" (excerpts)

Capt. A.T. Mahan's first book, published in 1890, was about 600 pages and included 30 illustrations (maps and plans, or track-charts, of sea battles), and can be downloaded from Project Gutenberg, file "13529-h.htm". It is also available in an unabridged trade paperback reprint from Dover Publications. His sequel on the British Navy during the years of the French Revolution was published in 1892 and is not available at Gutenberg (although several other Mahan books are, including the two volume "Life of Nelson." [[...]

The atlas-sized (9.5 x 12 in., 256 pages) hardcover edition reviewed here was published by Prentice-Hall in 1980 (ISBN: 0134645375) and has several advantages, the foremost being that it includes naval history and commentary covering the pinnacle of sailing sea power for the British Navy, as indicated in its title, "Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1805," the last being the year of Nelson's glorious victory at Tralfalgar. As a faithful introduction to Mahan's ideas and contributions to naval history for a strategic purpose it does a very good job, including ALL of his seminal chapter on the elements of sea power. The historical narrative which Mahan provided as exposition has only been slightly reduced by the editor, and in most cases flows intelligibly.

After the first five chapters of "Mahan's Influence...1660-1783," the abridgement in the 1980 Prentice-Hall edition is more severe, with the 6th chapter reduced to one sentence. Most of what is missing is political or land-based military background, and the editors have included all significant naval battles. Mahan's book had 14 chapters, and the last one corresponds to the tenth chapter of the 1980 edition; chapters 11 through 14 of the Prentice-Hall edition are taken from the sequel, "Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution 1793-1812."

One improvement is the updated sea battle plans or track-charts which have replaced Mahan's original illustrations and provide greater clarity of the actions. However, there are not as many of them and completely missing are the maps of the Mediterranean and other naval theaters. While the best part of Mahan's text has been included, over half the surface of the 256 pages has been devoted to non-Mahan illustrations, mostly taken from period paintings, engravings and models of sailing ships in port and in battle, and portraits of political and military figures. It is the American Heritage treatment, and I find it to be distracting, particularly the captions which often seem intent on making points not related to Mahan's narrative or principles. The lack of large scale strategic maps and the plethora of images of antique, albeit marvelous, sailing ships ultimately prove to be at odds with Mahan's primary lesson, that a national strategy of sea power depends on geography, a strong trade-based economy and national character, and not on any particular technology (sail) or tactics therof.

Bottom line: get this book for the pictures, and the Dover edition (ISBN: 0486255093) for Mahan's unabridged text which is still relevant today. Note that he saw the necessity of the U.S. providing a sphere of naval power in the Carribean and eastern Pacific prior to the construction of the Panama Canal. His conception of sea power was based on the model of the growth of the British Empire, which he thought America might aspire to as it developed into a manufacturing and trading powerhouse. And he warned that countries (Spain and Portugal in the time of his history) which held the production of real goods in contempt would loose power and ultimately decline. As for the projection of military power into the Middle East without any economic gain, and even going into deeper debt to do so, it is fair to say Mahan would consider it the height of folly. But you can read his book yourself and draw your own conclusions.

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